Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards
综述了劳动、环境、公司治理和银行金融四个领域监管套利的文献，发现企业跨境迁移和政府为影响迁移而调整政策的情况很少见，更常见的是辖区内政治压力导致异质性结果，监管趋同多源于协调或模仿。
This article surveys the literature on regulatory arbitrage in four settings: labor regulation, environmental protection, corporate governance, and banking and finance. For a regulatory race to occur, firms must migrate across state or country borders in response to geographic differences in the costs and benefits of regulation, and governments must shape their regulatory policies with the aim of affecting those migration flows. We find that both these conditions hold only in rare circumstances. Instead, the much more common outcome is for political pressures within jurisdictions to produce a heterogeneous pattern resembling Tiebout sorting. Such regulatory convergence as occurs is more often the result of deliberate harmonization or imitation.