Taxing and Regulating Vices*
研究了在消费者时间不一致（过度消费）且监管降低消费愉悦感、税收有行政与合规成本时，对罪恶品的最优税收与监管。发现即使有矫正税且消费者同质，监管也可能有益；两种工具并用时消费可能低于最优水平。
Abstract We study the optimal taxation and regulation of sin goods – goods that are enjoyable to consume but also create future negative health consequences – within a setting in which individuals are time‐inconsistent (and thus consume too much), regulation makes the consumption of sin goods less pleasurable, and taxation involves administrative and compliance costs. In contrast to previous literature, we find that regulation can be beneficial even when corrective taxes are available and individuals are homogeneous. Moreover, despite the inefficiencies associated with the use of both instruments, the consumption of the sin good might fall short of the first best. The results are robust to consumers’ heterogeneity.