The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance
利用监管者时间使用数据，发现美国同一监管区内规模排名靠前的银行受到更多监管关注，这些银行持有风险更低的贷款组合、波动性更小且对行业下行不敏感，但增长和盈利并未降低。
ABSTRACT We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top‐ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top‐ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.