Debt Covenant Violations, Firm Financial Distress, and Auditor Actions
研究了债务契约违约与审计师行动（审计费用、持续经营意见、审计师辞职）之间的关系，发现违约对所有类型企业（包括非财务困境企业）均有显著影响，且对非困境企业的影响更强。
Abstract We conduct a comprehensive study on the associations between debt covenant violations (“violations”) and auditor actions for financially distressed and nondistressed firms. Our study is motivated by a lack of research on the consequences of violations resulting from auditors' actions. We find that firms with violations have significantly higher audit fees, a greater likelihood of receiving a going‐concern opinion, and a greater likelihood of experiencing an auditor resignation. Importantly, the positive associations hold for all types of firms, including financially nondistressed firms. In fact, we find that, after controlling for other financial information, the relation between violations and an increased likelihood of a going‐concern opinion is stronger for nondistressed versus distressed firms. Our evidence is consistent with belief‐revision research in auditing that finds auditors react more strongly to information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This study provides further evidence on the indirect yet significant consequences of covenant violations on firms resulting from auditor actions.