Commentary: Citizen Attributions of Blame in Third‐Party Governance: A Practitioner's Perspective
本文从实践者角度评论了Marvel和Girth关于公共服务提供方式与公民问责的研究，指出公民通常不会因治理结构差异而改变对政治官员的责备，并讨论了第三方服务提供的现实复杂性。
John D. Marvel and Amanda M. Girth provide an admirable hypothesis and review of the literature on the method of public service delivery and public accountability in their article “Citizen Attributions of Blame in Third-Party Governance.” There is more theory on this topic than empirical testing, so their effort to test and develop empirical data is important to the profession and to future research. Unsurprisingly, however, they find no clear indication that structural differences between governance arrangements (“the length of the accountability chain”) affect the degree to which citizens blame political actors for deficiencies in service delivery. Citizens generally will blame elected or appointed officials regardless of the method of provision (public sector or third party) or the length of the chain of command between the elected official and the direct provider, which are the two factors tested in this empirical study. Many citizens, if asked, would not know whether a service was provided by the government entity or by a private contractor, except perhaps for such services as police and firefighting, with few or no third-party actors. Nor would they be able to plot the layers of bureaucracy between the direct service provider and the elected official(s), ordinarily lacking access to the governmental organization chart. Furthermore, existing research shows that differences in methods of service provision do not tend to make citizens shift blame attribution. If citizens are unhappy with service quality and performance and do not get immediate relief from their initial point of contact, they will go directly to their elected officials. With many alternative provider options available, pricing and providing public services at all government levels have become increasingly complex. Third parties often provide trash collection and disposal; likewise public transit service, land management (landscaping), and janitorial support. Most government entities often explore, if not opt for, third-party vendors for specialized services when in-house capabilities are limited or when cost–benefit analysis clearly points to the third-party provider. Third parties typically perform engineering, project management, and construction of capital projects, primarily because retaining a full-time cadre of skills on the public payroll for limited-term activities is not cost-effective. Typically, the government entity will retain a core staff to manage contracts, budgets, and inspection services, but the work itself is done by external providers. We see a similar pattern in the provision of technology services and support to government organizations. Government in-house talent is rarely, if ever, sufficient to develop and manage the variety of platforms, databases, and applications that governments now need. Such talent is simply not available or affordable. Political pressure to lower taxes and the perception that the private sector can better perform certain services have contributed to growth in the use of alternative service models and the growing availability of private options, as well as the development of quasi-governmental entities with independent power and authority, such as port authorities, regional mobility authorities, metropolitan planning organizations, or organizations such as the Public Service Board (PSB), which was enabled in El Paso, Texas, decades ago to manage the city-owned water and wastewater utilities, as well as to hold in trust city-owned lands for water rights. The PSB has proven to be a model of efficiency and effectiveness, providing cutting-edge innovation on water conservation, good fiscal management, and good decision making using a business model. The intent at that time was to remove politics from land disposal decision making and rate setting. Efforts to internalize this agency back the under direct control of the mayor and city council have been vigorously resisted by the business sector and the general community at large. A review of the history of the development of most of these quasi-governmental models would likely show similar intent and results. Having worked in local government for more than 30 years, I can attest to the tensions that arise when a public entity explores privatization or alternative delivery models. The issue of control is always a factor. Then there is the debate about public employees having a higher commitment to the public good. The decision on how to provide the service always came down to the cost–benefit analysis, the degree of risk, and the flexibility to be able to adapt quickly to the changing environment, which government entities often have difficulty doing. The key is to structure the contract and performance incentives so they achieve desired outcomes. Future research should explore the rationale of government leaders for use of third-party providers. If it is solely to reduce costs, then satisfaction with service or cost savings will likely erode over time. Joyce Wilson is former city manager of El Paso, Texas, where she served for 10 years as the first city manager. She has more than 30 years of management and executive leadership experience in local government. She is presently chief executive officer of the regional workforce board. E-mail: [email protected]