Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics
构建模型解释犯罪组织如何策略性地在选举前使用暴力影响选举结果和政客行为，并用意大利西西里及全国数据验证，发现暴力在选举结果不确定时更频繁，且会减少对犯罪组织反对党的投票。
We develop a model explaining how criminal organizations strategically use pre-electoral violence as a way of influencing electoral results and politicians’ behaviour. We then characterize the incentives to use such violence under different levels of electoral competition and different electoral rules. Our theory is consistent with the empirical evidence within Sicily and across Italian regions. Specifically, the presence of organized crime is associated with abnormal spikes in violence against politicians before elections—particularly when the electoral outcome is more uncertain—which in turn reduces voting for parties opposed by criminal organizations. Using a very large data set of parliamentary debates, we also show that violence by the Sicilian Mafia reduces anti-Mafia efforts by members of parliament appointed in Sicily, particularly from the parties that traditionally oppose the Mafia.