Pressure and Performance in Accounting Decision Settings: Paradoxical Effects of Incentives, Feedback, and Justification
发现，在重复性分类决策任务中，财务激励、绩效反馈和证明责任要求在没有决策辅助时能提高准确率，但在有决策辅助时反而降低准确率，揭示了这些因素的悖论效应。
This paper shows that the positive effects on decision making of financial incentives, performance feedback, and the requirement to justify one's decisions to others can be undermined or even reversed by the availability of a decision aid. More specifically, in the absence of a decision aid, subjects achieved greater classification accuracy in a repetitive decision task when a monetary incentive was offered, or when feedback about past performance was provided, or when they were required to justify their choices, relative to the absence of these three variables. In contrast, when a statistically valid decision aid was available, the same incentive, feedback, and justification requirements resulted in lower classification accuracy, again relative to the absence of these three variables. These results are interpreted within a framework having two basic tenets. First, financial incentives, performance feedback, and a justifi-