Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment Problem
研究了当公司存在风险债务时，股东可能放弃正净现值的自由裁量投资，而债券持有人希望投资，这种激励冲突可通过债券合同中的保险条款来控制，且通常不需要全额保险。
A casualty loss produces option-like characteristics in assets because their value depends on further discretionary investment. With risky debt in the firm's capital structure, the shareholders can have incentives to forgo the discretionary investment, even though it has a positive net present value. Thus a potential incentive conflict exists between the bondholders who want the investment made and the shareholders who do not. The incentive problem can be controlled by including a covenant in the bond contract requiring insurance coverage. Full coverage is generally not required. The maximum deductible depends on the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure and the feasible set of net casualty losses.