Complexity, Rogue Outcomes and Weapon Systems
研究美国陆军M1艾布拉姆斯坦克案例，分析采纳复杂技术带来的组织后果，特别是如何处理新技术中不可预知的问题，以及1991年海湾战争对解决方案的检验。
What are the organizational implications of adopting complex technologies? In this study of the U.S. Army's Ml 'Abrams tank, Chris C. Demchak details the organizational consequences of contending with the complications created by this new weapon system. She focuses attention on how the Army handled set outcomes-that is, those problems that are unknowable when the new technology is adopted. More complex organizational arrangements resulted from efforts to deal with the Ml's rouge set. The ultimate test provided by the 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrated that solutions were possible under the right circumstances. The lessons of the Ml case, however, demonstrate the need for greater attention to the organizational implications of adopting systems. One of the interesting stories of the 1980s is that of large-scale organizations convulsing themselves in order to adopt modern technologies in their operations.' The results have sometimes been puzzling and none more so than the U.S. Army's experiences with its newest high tech tank. Amid much fanfare at the start of the decade, the Army purchased a modern, integrated, main battle tank. Throughout the decade, critics wondered aloud about the tank's operational effectiveness and the consequences for its performance on the battlefield. The machine was more complex than its predecessors and much more expensive to operate. By 1988, the U.S. Army was sadly announcing its inability to diagnose tank failures and meet adequately the tank's maintenance needs (Tice, 1988). After the brief 1991 Gulf War, published reports seemed to vindicate the Army and the tank.