Expertise and Auditors' Judgments of conjunctive Events
提出一个正式方法分析审计师记忆与审计证据的交互如何影响判断，并用该方法预测和展示特定知识差异在抽象情境中的判断效应，对理解审计专业能力有参考价值。
Although research on the nature of professional audit judgment has expanded recently, surprisingly little is known about the role of education and experience. Existing post hoc analyses of the relation between performance (mostly lens model statistics) and years of experience have produced inconclusive and conflicting results (see Joyce and Libby [1982] and Ashton [1983]). In these studies, little attempt was made in advance to specify the knowledge necessary to perform the judgment task, the stage at which such knowledge would normally be acquired, or the process by which it would be brought to bear on the decision problem. Recently, it has been recognized that understanding the role of expertise in auditors' judgments will require a more detailed analysis of the nature of audit knowledge and the basic memory processes involved in learning and retrieving this knowledge (see, e.g., Weber [1980], Libby [1985], and Plumlee [1985]). This paper has two goals. The first is to develop a formal approach for examining how the auditor's memory store interacts with current audit evidence to determine judgment. The failure of less systematic efforts to examine these issues suggests the need for more formality and structure. The second goal is to use the approach to predict and demonstrate the judgmental effect of a specific knowledge difference in an abstract setting. The conflicting and inconclusive results of prior studies indicate the nontrivial nature of this task, even in an abstract setting. This study