Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited
研究了133家德国公司2003-2006年的数据，发现董事会在社会网络中联系越紧密，公司绩效越差、高管薪酬越高，而简单的忙碌指标无法揭示这一现象。
Abstract We investigate the relationship between firm governance and the board's position in the social network of directors. Using a sample of 133 German firms over the four‐year period from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms with intensely connected supervisory boards are (1) associated with lower firm performance, and (2) pay their executives significantly more. We interpret these results as evidence of poor monitoring in firms with directors who are more embedded in the social network. In both cases, simple measures for busy directors that were used by other studies in the past fail to show any significant pattern. The findings suggest that the quality and structural position of additional board seats may play a bigger role than simply the number of board appointments.