The Impact of MAS on Auditors' Independence: An Experimental Markets Study
通过实验市场研究，考察提供管理咨询服务是否影响审计师独立性，并探讨审计与管理咨询联合提供的其他潜在效应。
In this paper we report results from an experimental markets study of how the provision of a management advisory service (MAS) and an audit service might affect the demand for and the supply of these interrelated services. This study was originally motivated by the long-standing debate on whether the provision of MAS adversely affects auditor's independence. As the study progressed, however, the complex interactions between MAS and auditing services led us to broaden our focus to include other potential effects of allowing auditors jointly to provide both services. These other effects can confound the study of the independence issue, as we note below. In its early stages, the debate on the independence issue focused on whether the provision of MAS that was an integral part of the audit (e.g., design of clients' information and internal control systems) would prevent auditors from objectively reviewing the quality of these services (Metcalf Committee Staff Study [1977]). The Cohen Commission [1978], organized by the AICPA to investigate allegations of audit inadequacies, concluded that it could not find evidence indicating that the provision of MAS was associated with substand-