Stocks vs Mutuals: Who Controls?
通过调查股份保险公司和相互保险公司的控制权差异，检验相互保险公司保单持有人的控制力是否弱于股份保险公司的股东。
To what extent do the legal owners of large corporations really control their enterprises? Are directors self-perpetuating entities who control the fortunes of their corporations without effective influence or interference by the stockholder-owners? In the life insurance industry the answers to these questions were such that following the discovery of abuses in control revealed by the famous Armstrong Investigation of 1905,1 many of the major life insurers in the United States were mutualized (i.e., adopted that form of organization in which the policyholders became the legal owners). It was expected that this form of organization would not only help reduce abuses in control, but would also deliver insurance at the least possible cost by eliminating profits. The present note reports findings from a survey of both stock and mutual insurers to learn if the influence of mutual insurer policyholders in controlling their companies is different from the influence of stockholders of stock insurers. The major questions addressed were intended to reflect the extent to which the state laws governing the conduct of mutual organizations do in fact, as argued by Gary P. Kreider,2 lead to less power by mutual owners than that enjoyed by stockholders.