Supply licensing when the manufacturer strategically commits to invest in R&D
研究了一个专有组件供应商为何会向竞争对手或制造商许可技术，原因是供应商预期制造商会战略承诺投资研发，模型显示这种承诺使供应商能增加销量并降低价格。
Abstract This article proposes a strategic reason for a proprietary component supplier to license her technology to a competitor or a manufacturer: her anticipation of the manufacturer's strategic commitment to invest in research and development (R&D). We address this phenomenon with a game theoretic model. Our results show that the manufacturer's full commitment to invest in R&D enables the supplier to license, sell a larger quantity through the supply chain, and charge lower prices. These results are robust to the type of demand uncertainty faced by the manufacturer within the class of increasing generalized failure rate distributions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 341–350, 2014