Strategic Sample Size Choice in Auditing
在Shibano的隐藏行动模型中引入样本量选择，分析审计师如何权衡抽样成本与报告错误概率，以战略性控制审计风险并影响被审计方行为。
The purpose of this paper is to model the auditor's strategic choice of how much evidence to collect by adding sample size as an choice to Shibano's [1990] hidden action setting. Like Newman and Noel [1989], I assume that the sample evidence distribution is normal in order to simplify the analysis. Both Shibano and Newman and Noel examine the strategic interactions of auditors and auditees when the auditor chooses an audit report in a hidden action fixed sample size model. When sample size is fixed, the auditor's selection of type I or type II sampling risk simultaneously determines the other type of sampling risk.1 The auditor trades off the probability of type I and type II audit reporting errors, based on the cost of these errors. When the auditor also chooses sample size, the auditor trades off the reduction in the probability of either a type I or type II audit reporting error against increases in sampling costs. In a strategic sampling model, sample size choice enlarges the auditor's opportunity to control the expected costs from audit reporting errors and increases the number of ways to affect auditee behavior.