Equilibria in Budget Participation
扩展委托代理分析，研究经理参与预算编制过程时的均衡问题，探讨信息沟通对绩效评估的影响，为预算参与提供理论依据。
The objective of this paper is to extend principal-agency analysis to a problem which behavioral researchers in accounting have been studying for quite some time-the participation of managers in the budgeting process. My objective is to model the relationship between the principal (called the owner) and the agent (called the manager) so as to provide a rationale for budget participation. However, there are fundamental difficulties that may occur when a manager provides information that will influence his subsequent performance evaluation. Different approaches to handling these difficulties are considered, with the objective of discovering equilibrium levels of budget participation. The basic problem considered in this paper is similar to that in Townsend [1976] and Baiman and Demski [1978], but there are differences in the environments in which the analysis is conducted. At the end of the paper, I briefly compare my results with those found by other authors. The problem addressed here differs from the usual agency analysis in that I introduce the possibility of communication between the players in the principal/agent game. Although communication is allowed in team theory models like those used by Groves [1973] and Groves and Loeb [1975], they do not consider effort aversion on the part of the agent, which plays a significant role in the rationale for budget participation. Similarly, while behavioral researchers have been considering the effects of budget-participation on employee behavior, job satisfaction, performance evaluation, and so on, for many years (e.g., Argyris [1952], Becker