Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power
研究了风险投资公司的议价能力如何影响其投资组合公司的估值，发现大学和政府背景的VC因议价能力更强而谈判出更低估值。
Abstract: This study explores the impact of the bargaining power of venture capital (VC) firms on the valuation of their portfolio companies. VC firm types with greater bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the entrepreneur are expected to negotiate lower valuations compared with VC firm types with less bargaining power. Consistent with this hypothesis, university and government VC firms, which have comparatively greater bargaining power, negotiate lower valuations compared with independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest that valuations in the VC contract reflect the relative bargaining power of the VC investor.