Incentives in Collective Action Organizations
基于美国全国性协会数据，研究成员对不同类型激励的兴趣如何影响其参与行为，发现规范和社会激励促进内部参与，游说激励促进外部参与，而物质激励则与参与负相关。
The effects of members' interests in incentives offered by collective-action organizations are examined with data from a national sample of American associations. Members expressed interests in six distinct dimensions underlying organizational-incentive systems, and these different aspects are specifically related to different types of member involvement, controlling for other personal and organizational attributes. Members with higher interests in normative and social inducements offered by their organizations are more likely to contribute time, money, and psychological commitment and to engage in internal participatory actions. Lobbying incentives are strongly related to external participation. Overtly utilitarian incentives such as material benefits, occupational rewards, and informational incentives are either unrelated to involvement or actually attract members unwilling to participate. The implications of these results for Olson's by-product or selective-incentive explanation of collective action are discussed.