Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis
研究大股东通过退出威胁影响公司治理的机制，利用金融危机和十进制化作为股票流动性的外生冲击，发现大股东持股比例高的公司在流动性变化时价值波动更大，且该效应在经理人财富对股价敏感时更显著。
ABSTRACT Recent theory posits a new governance channel available to blockholders: threat of exit. Threat of exit, as opposed to actual exit, is difficult to measure directly. However, a crucial property is that it is weaker when stock liquidity is lower and vice versa. We use natural experiments of financial crises and decimalization as exogenous shocks to stock liquidity. Firms with larger blockholdings experience greater declines (increases) in firm value during the crises (decimalization), particularly if the manager's wealth is sensitive to the stock price and thus to exit threats. Additional tests suggest exit threats are distinct from blockholder intervention.