Imperfect Patent Protection and Innovation
研究了在过程创新中加强专利保护对研发激励的影响，发现对于非颠覆性创新，当法院设定的预期许可费足够高时，创新者可能偏好模仿，因此研发投资在中等专利强度下最大。
The paper studies the effect of strengthening protection on R&D incentives in the context of process innovation. It shows that for non‐drastic innovations, that do not render the pre‐existing technology obsolete, the innovator might favor imitation if the expected royalty rate determined by the court is sufficiently high. Since imitation is discouraged for very high levels of patent protection, R&D investment is maximized for an intermediate level of patent strength. This finding provides a theoretical explanation for emerging empirical evidence questioning the effectiveness of strengthening protection on innovation incentives. It also serves as a justification for the imperfections of the existing patent system that allows for some infringement.