Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim Reporting
研究在无强制中期报告要求时，企业自愿发布中期报告的经济动机，分析为何企业选择特定的外部报告频率，对会计文献中规范性的中期报告讨论形成对比。
In the absence of mandatory interim reporting requirements, some firms voluntarily published interim reports. Attempts to mandate interim reporting encountered strong opposition from other firms. In this paper, we investigate the economic incentives of managers of corporations to provide interim reports voluntarily. In particular, we analyze why corporations choose a particular reporting frequency for external purposes. Our approach is in direct contrast to the predominantly normative thrust of much of the accounting literature dealing with interim reporting. Prescriptions concerning the desirable frequency of corporate reporting are common in that literature' and much attention is devoted to two related issues: (1) how frequently should corporations be required to report to their stockholders (i.e., semiannually, quarterly, or even monthly)? and (2) how should interim reports relate to annual reports? Little attention is given to the incentives of managers to choose a particular reporting frequency for external purposes.