Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital
研究了盈余管理如何影响企业资本成本，发现操纵程度随经济周期变化，且因企业盈余状况不同而在好或坏时期有更强动机夸大业绩，这种依赖性使盈余操纵在分散化下仍影响资本成本。
ABSTRACT The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.