Providing political leadership? Three case studies on Germany's ambiguous role in the eurozone crisis
通过希腊救助、超级专员失败和财政契约三个案例，分析德国在欧元危机中时而拒绝、时而失败、时而成功的领导行为，解释其角色差异的原因。
Throughout the eurozone crisis, observers called upon Germany to assume leadership. Yet, Germany has not emerged as the hoped-for leader. According to the issue at stake, we observe three different outcomes: firstly, Germany refused to lead; secondly, Germany assumed leadership, but failed to deliver; thirdly, Germany acted as a successful leader. This article examines the reasons for this variance by analysing and comparing one case for each outcome: the first financial assistance to Greece; the failed attempt to establish a ‘super-commissioner'; and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. The analysis includes original data, gathered through interviews in Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin. The variance in Germany's behaviour can be explained by employing a rational institutionalist model of leadership. Germany's emergence as a leader depends on the expected costs and benefits of leading. Its impact, in contrast, depends on its power, the distribution of preferences among the actors involved and institutional constraints.