Self-Selection and the Probability of Quitting: A Contracting Approach to Employee Turnover in Public Accounting
分析公共会计事务所员工流动的成本与收益，提出通过不同雇佣合同控制离职，帮助事务所平衡流动的利弊。
Employee turnover in public accounting is a complex phenomenon which has various costs and benefits to a firm. Costs of turnover include increased recruiting and training activities, complications and uncertainties in planning operations, and possible decreases in client goodwill if the audit personnel assigned to a client change too frequently. Benefits of turnover include culling nonpromotable personnel, flexibility in maintaining the optimal size of labor force, and possible increases in client goodwill if loyal former employees obtain responsible positions in the financial community. In the light of these costs and benefits, turnover should not be viewed as a problem to be eliminated but as a phenomenon to be understood and, to the extent possible, controlled so that firms can approach an optimal balance between the costs and benefits. This paper examines the possibility of using different employment contracts to control turnover. There are three features of employee turnover in public accounting which are of interest here. As alluded to above, one is the degree of control that a firm has over a given employee's departure. Controlled turnover consists of terminations and/or placements by a firm, while noncontrolled turnover consists of resignations that are not requested