CEO Ownership, Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion
研究发现CEO持股能带来4%至10%的年化超额收益，在外部治理弱、产品市场竞争弱和管理层自由裁量权大的公司中效果最强，表明市场未正确定价管理层持股的激励效应。
ABSTRACT We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4% to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion, suggesting that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner‐CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.