Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosure
实证研究企业盈利波动性与管理层盈利预测披露时机和频率的关系，探讨波动性如何影响管理者自愿披露的意愿，对理解企业信息披露决策有参考价值。
In this paper I report the findings of an empirical investigation of the association between firms' earnings volatility and the timing and frequency of management earnings forecasts. Such a relationship might be expected if earnings volatility is associated with either the costs or benefits to executives in publicly disclosing such projections. A potential cost-related interpretation is that managers of firms with more volatile earnings are reluctant to disclose their forecasts due to increased exposure to costs (e.g., legal sanctions) associated with unattained projections. A benefit-related interpretation might be that managers perceive benefits from issuing forecasts which improve the projections of individuals (e.g., security analysts) external to the firm. To the extent that informativeness of forecast information is related to management's ability to generate accurate projections, then an association between volatility and forecast disclosure frequency might be expected. Recent survey evidence by Lees [1981] suggests that both of these factors appear to be consistent with stated executive preferences about voluntary forecast disclosure. Further