Workers' Compensation Liability Changes and the Distribution of Injury Claims
构建损失最小化模型，预测工人赔偿福利增加会降低员工事故预防努力并增加索赔，而雇主会加强安全措施。实证发现责任分担变化显著改变特定类型伤害的比例。
This paper presents a loss minimization model which predicts that employees will decrease their accident prevention effort and supply more claims as workers' compensation benefits increase. Likewise the model predicts that employers will increase their safety effort. These predictions are tested in the context of an empirical model which asserts that the decrease in employee effort will manifest itself as changes in the relative likelihood of certain types of injuries without necessarily changing the overall injury rate. The results demonstrate that significant changes in the proportion of certain types of injuries do occur when liability shares are changed.