The Effects of Uncertainty and Disclosure on Auditors' Fair Value Materiality Decisions
实验发现，当公允价值同时包含更多输入主观性和结果不精确性时，审计师最可能要求调整；但客户补充披露会降低这种可能性，产生道德许可效应，可能影响财务报表中确认的公允价值。
ABSTRACT Financial accounting standards increasingly require fair value measurements. I experimentally examine how uncertainty affects auditors’ adjustment decisions when evaluating fair values. I manipulate two types of uncertainty, input subjectivity and outcome imprecision , and one reporting choice, supplemental disclosure . I find that auditors are most likely to require adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision, but that this likelihood diminishes when clients supplement recognized fair values with additional disclosure. Thus, consistent with moral licensing, I find that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the financial statements when clients provide disclosure, suggesting that the SEC's preference for supplemental disclosure may have the unintended consequence of affecting fair values recognized in the body of the financial statements. I also provide evidence that auditors determine adjustment size by comparing recorded fair value to the nearest bound, rather than the midpoint, of the auditors’ own range estimate, consistent with strict application of auditing standards.