Party Politics and the Default Move from Coordination to Liberalism
研究了丹麦和英国首个全国性多部门雇主协会的起源，分析政党竞争结构如何影响雇主间的协调，并解释为何一些国家走向高度集中的统一商业协会而另一些国家退回自由主义。
This article delves into the origins of the first national multi-sector employers' associations in Denmark and the United Kingdom to understand why some countries produce highly-centralized, unitary national business associations, which develop labor market coordination with unions and the state. In contrast, other countries conclude their experiment with coordination by ultimately falling back on laissez-faire liberalism. In particular, I explore how the structure of party competition works to augment or to diminish coordination among employers. I argue that the interplay of party politics in the policy-making process influenced the incentives of opposing parties to block the legislation sought by employers, informed the incentives of the business-oriented right parties to delegate policy-making authority to private business and labor organizations, and shaped the capacities of employers to get what they wanted from the state.