Measuring Executive Compensation: Methods and an Application
描述了估算企业高管年度总薪酬价值的方法，并探讨这些方法在会计政策选择、投资决策和薪酬合同变更影响研究中的应用。
This paper describes methods for estimating the value of the total annual compensation of top corporate executives. These methods refine those originated by Burgess [1963], Lewellen [1968], and Masson [1969]. Measures of executive compensation are relevant in addressing three current issues. First is the extent to which the compensation effects of different accounting alternatives influence executives' preferences over proposed changes in accounting regulations and their actual selection of financial reporting techniques. Second is whether compensation effects of new financial reporting standards induce managers to change their production and investment decisions. Third is the impact of a change in the terms of executives' compensation contracts on their decisions.'