Reliability, Responsiveness, and Regulatory Policy
本文探讨了在动态技术和有限理性条件下，监管机构如何确保企业绩效的可靠性和对社会模糊关切的响应性，并分析了可靠性问题的成因、后果及监管方法。
Three Mile Island, Love Canal, and dioxin contamination are spectacular examples of problems confronting regulatory officials every day. Yet, accepted regulatory theories of market failure, capture, and deterrence provide little guidance for such problems arising from dynamic technologies and fallible control systems. This essay probes the implications of bounded rationality and advanced technologies for regulatory policy, and asks what role regulatory agencies can play in assuring the reliability of corporate performance and the responsiveness of corporations to vaguely defined and poorly understood social concerns. The first section of this article introduces two regulatory concerns, reliability and responsibility. The next section argues that the dynamic nature of regulatory issues, when combined with the limited rationality of corporations, justifies attention to these concerns. Then, the causes, consequences, and regulatory methods for dealing with reliability and responsiveness are analyzed. Finally, the implications for regulatory policy are discussed, emphasizing the need to improve the design of adaptive expert systems as a whole, since both public and private components are fallible.