Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers
研究了当竞标者面临资金约束时，法律投资者保护如何影响公司控制权市场的效率。更强的法律保护增加了竞标者的外部融资能力，但在缺乏有效竞争时无助于效率提升；而在有效竞争下，能防止效率高但资金少的竞标者被效率低但资金多的对手击败。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders' outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition, this does not improve efficiency, as the bid price, and thus bidders' need for funds, increases one‐for‐one with the pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity improves efficiency by making it less likely that more efficient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less efficient but wealthier rivals.