Equilibrium Warrant Pricing Models and Accounting for Executive Stock Options
实证评估两种估值模型在估计权证价值上的表现，权证与高管股票期权相似，结果有助于校准会计中低估期权成本的误差。
Under APB Opinion No. 25, compensation expense arising from executive stock options consists of the excess of the market value of the stock over the exercise price of the options on their grant dates. If the exercise price equals the market value of the stock on the grant date (which is typically the case), no compensation expense is recognized. This accounting treatment has been frequently criticized for its bias toward underestimating the cost of an option to the issuing firm, and a number of alternative valuation models have been suggested in the accounting literature.' By and large, these valuation models have been borrowed from the finance literature where they were developed to explain the pricing of warrants and traded options. The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically how well two of these valuation models perform in providing estimates of the value of traded securities (warrants) that are similar in many respects to executive stock options.2 This evidence should help calibrate the magnitude of the errors