The Relation Among Capital Markets, Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading
建立模型，分析企业融资的资本市场性质、财务披露水平、资本成本、剩余代理问题及内幕交易程度之间的关联，披露水平由生产效率效应和补偿补贴效应与市场非流动性效应及资本成本效应的权衡决定。
The purpose of this paper is to establish a link among (1) the nature of the capital market from which a firm secures its investment funds, (2) the firm's chosen level of financial disclosure, (3) the firm's cost of capital, (4) the extent of its residual agency problems, and (5) the extent of insider trading in its shares, in a model in which the costs and benefits associated with disclosure are endogenous. The nature of the capital market is characterized in our discussion by the potential liquidity needs of investors from whom capital is raised. The level of disclosure is determined by trading off a production efficiency effect and a compensation subsidy effect, both of which fall with increased disclosure, against a market illiquidity effect and its effect on the cost of capital, both of which also fall with increased disclosure. Production efficiency falls because more disclosure means less information about the manager's action is impounded in price, so that price-based