The SEC's Influence on Accounting Standards: The Power of the Veto
探讨美国证券交易委员会（SEC）在会计准则制定中的否决权，分析其如何影响APB和FASB的决策过程，对关注会计政策政治性的学者有参考价值。
The political nature of accounting standard setting is becoming increasingly apparent. Both professional and academic journals have discussed the political characteristics of the environment in which the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have functioned (see, for example, Horngren [1973], Meyer [1974], May and Sundem [1976], Armstrong [1977], Rockness and Nikolai [1977], Ronen and Schiff [1978], Solomons [1978], Newman [1981], and Brown [1981]). One feature of this environment which has been given little specific attention is the influence of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (vis-A-vis the APB or the FASB) on the process of selecting accounting standards. The Metcalf staff report (U.S. Congress [1976]) critically evaluates the existing approach of the SEC to the accounting policy process [1976, pp. 17-18]: Congress gave the SEC broad authority to establish accounting and reporting standards as part of its mandate to administer and enforce the provisions of the Federal securities laws. Soon after its creation, the SEC decided by a vote of three to two votes not to exercise its authority to set accounting standards. Instead, the SEC decided to rely on accounting standards established in the private sector as being protective of the public interest, as long as such standards have substantial authoritative support. In effect, the SEC has delegated the establishment of accounting standards which are binding on all publicly-owned corporations to the special interest groups which control the FASB, and has reserved a mere oversight role for itself. The Metcalf staff thus implies that the SEC has not satisfied its public responsibilities since private-sector boards control the initiative in standard setting.