Costly Signalling in Auctions
分析了一种动态拍卖，其中部分出价是沉没成本，竞拍者通过跳价传递私人信息，探讨了虚张声势和隐藏实力两种策略及其对均衡出价的影响。
This paper analyses a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A player with a moderate valuation bluffs by making a high bid and drops out if his bluff is called. A player with a high valuation should vary his bids and should sometimes sandbag by bidding low, to induce lower bids by his rival. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.