Pre-Decision Information and Participative Management Control Systems
研究在上级信息劣势时，让下级参与管理控制过程（如预算制定、目标管理）对福利的影响，以及下级私有信息量变化时的福利效应。
In this paper we examine a two-person agency model in which decisionmaking responsibilities have been delegated to a subordinate who has better information than the superior.' We first study the welfare effects of allowing the subordinate to participate in the management control process. We then study the welfare effects of varying the amount of the subordinate's private information in the presence of such a participative management control system. Many commonly used management control procedures involve participation. These include: bottom-up budgeting, management by objectives, and participative standard-setting. Each of these procedures allows the subordinate to negotiate with the superior over the design of the former's performance evaluation system and payment schedule. For example, the subordinate can negotiate over the standards or budget against which his actual performance will be compared. Thus, participation is a negotiation process. In a participative setting each individual chooses his negotiation strategy based on his own information. If, as we assume in this paper, the subordinate has better information than the superior, the subordinate may choose a strategy which reveals some of his private information.