The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices
提出用期权价格估算股票投票权市场价值的方法，发现投票权价值为正且随合成股票到期时间增加，在特别股东大会、对冲基金活跃和并购事件期间上升。
ABSTRACT This paper proposes a new method using option prices to estimate the market value of the shareholder voting rights associated with a stock. The method consists of synthesizing a nonvoting share using put‐call parity, and comparing its price to that of the underlying stock. Empirically, we find this measure of the value of voting rights to be positive and increasing in the time to expiration of synthetic stocks. The measure also increases around special shareholder meetings, periods of hedge fund activism, and M&A events. The method is likely useful in studies of corporate control and also has asset pricing implications.