Moral Hazard and Pricing in the U. K. Fire Insurance Market
研究了保险合同中风险转移导致的道德风险如何受保费结构影响，发现市场压力促使保险公司收集信息以制定差异化费率，并通过保费激励影响投保人的损失预防行为。
Moral hazard arises from the transfer of risk under an insurance policy. However, its potency depends on the discriminatory power of the premium structure. This paper shows that market pressures lead insurers to seek out information required to impose an effective discriminatory rate structure and to use this information to create premium (dis)incentives for improved loss prevention. Data from the U.K. fire insurance market show evidence of an intensive information search on the part of insurers and that loss prevention decisions made by insureds are related to premium incentives.