Social Insurance and the Marriage Market
研究瑞典取消遗属保险如何影响婚姻市场，发现该政策改变了人们进入婚姻的决策、提高了离婚率并增强了匹配的同类相配性，表明婚姻行为是夫妻规划老年财务安全的关键策略。
Social insurance is often linked to marriage. Existing evidence suggests small marital responses to financial incentives and stems from settings where benefits are realized in the near future. I analyze how linking survivors insurance to marriage affects the marriage market. Exploiting Sweden’s elimination of survivors insurance, I demonstrate that severing this link (1) affected entry into marriage up to 50 years before expected payout, (2) raised the divorce rate by 10%, and (3) raised the assortativeness of matching. This suggests that marital behavior is a key component of couples’ strategies to plan for financial security in old age.