Directorship Interlocks and Corporate Profitability
区分了两类董事连锁，并发现只有特定类型（同一对公司在同一方向上重新建立的意外断裂连锁）与企业盈利能力显著相关，且盈利能力是因、连锁是果。
Versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the Administrative Science Association of Canada and the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, Guelph, Ontario, May and June 1984, respectively. The author gratefully acknowledges the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the support, and the insightful comments of Robert Brym, Bonnie Erickson, Nancy Howell, Alfred Hunter, Michael Ornstein, Lorne Tepperman, Barry Wellman, and Harrison White on the research on which this paper is based. I especially thank Richard Daft and the anonymous ASQ reviewers for their extensive and helpful comments on a previous draft. This paper contributes to recent progress in conceptual clarifications that differentiate between two types of interorganizational directorship interlocks-those that appear to perform interorganizational functions and those apparently fulfilling integrative functions that transcend narrow corporate interests. It then develops, from a synthesis of the interorganizational theories, a set of testable hypotheses concerning the relationship between specific types of directorship interlocks and corporate profitability. An empirical analysis of the top 200 corporations in the postwar Canadian economy shows that accidentally broken interlocks that have been replaced by a new interlock in the same direction between the same pair of firms-and only these interlocks-are strongly related to corporate profitability. The findings also refute the propositions of financial control and co-optation theorists that directorship interlocks affect corporate profitability by demonstrating the reverse causal direction-that this specific type of interlock is found as a result of the profitability of the corporations involved.'