Concealment of Negative Organizational Outcomes: An Agency Theory Perspective
研究了企业高管是否、何时以及如何故意向股东隐瞒负面结果，发现外部董事、大型机构投资者和会计师能限制隐瞒，而小型机构投资者和持股的外部董事反而会促使隐瞒。
To explore if, when, and how intentionally corporate officers conceal negative organizational outcomes from shareholders, we used computer-assisted content analysis of over 1,000 president's letters contained in annual reports to shareholders. Results suggest that outside directors, large institutional investors, and accountants limit such concealment, but small institutional investors and outside directors who are shareholders prompt it. Low disclosure is associated with subsequent selling of stock by top officers and outside directors. This result supports the claim that concealment by officers and its toleration by outside directors may be intentional.