Target Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Price
研究发现，信息不对称程度更高的目标公司会获得更高的收购溢价，且收购方投资者对此反应更积极，表明市场认可收购方的定价。
Abstract This study investigates the effects of target information asymmetry in a takeover transaction. We find that a target with more information asymmetry receives a larger bid premium from the acquirer. We examine the response of the acquirer's investors to the bid to clarify whether the larger bid premium is an overpayment by the acquirer. We observe that the acquirer's investors respond more positively to the acquisition of an opaque target, indicating that the market recognizes the acquirer's valuation of the opaque target and agrees with the offer price. Our results indicate that corporate takeovers help to resolve asymmetric information in the capital market.