U. S. Defense Spending under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 1986-1989
研究了1985年格拉姆-鲁德曼-霍林斯法案对1986-1989年美国国防支出的影响，发现该法案使国防支出低于无法案水平，且除研发测试评估外各功能类别支出削减比例相似。
How did the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) impact on U.S. defense spending? Focusing on defense spendingfrom 1986-1989, Sung Deuk Hahm, Mark Kamlet, and David Moweryfound defense spending to be lower than it would have been without GRH. GRH partially, but not completely, returned defense spending priorities and defense-fiscalpolicy linkages to theirpreReagan status. GRH restrained expenditures by a similar percentage in all of the functional defense categories except one-the politically sensitive areas of research, development, test and evaluation. This finding contrasts with previous studies thatfound the impacts to be uneven across functional spending categories. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) of 1985 represented one of the most dramatic postwar efforts to change federal budgetary outcomes by changing the federal budgetary process. GRH was a legislative response to the large structural federal deficits of the mid-1980s and the associated political stalemate between President Reagan and Congress on deficit reduction. The President was unwilling to cut defense spending or raise taxes, the Democrats in Congress were unwilling to cut low-income programs or domestic controllable programs, and neither side wanted to cut middle-class entitlements. GRH sought to break this deadlock, forcing deficit reduction by making the alternative to deficit reduction politically unpalatable.