The Resource Allocation Effects of Mandated Relationships
研究城市政府在强制集体谈判和仲裁法律环境下，警察部门下属单位如何通过谈判获得更多预算份额，揭示法律强制关系对资源配置的影响。
We are grateful to the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice for financially supporting part of this research and to Greg Oldham, Charles O'Reilly, Dave Whetten, Jim Meindl and three anonymous ASQ referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Using a coalitional budgeting framework, this study examines city governments' resource allocations to police department subunits in differing legal environments. Collective bargaining is argued to increase subunit power; moreover, subunits' relative power is greater when cities are parties to mandated (i.e., legislated) collective bargaining and interest arbitration relationships than when cities are not covered by laws. Results taking into account city-specific effects invariant over time suggest that though bargaining in the absence of a law had no effect on resource allocations to the police department subunit, bargaining subunits covered by laws were able to attain larger shares of city budgets when resources were scarce.'