Deposit Finance as a Commitment Device and the Optimal Debt Structure of Commercial Banks
研究了受监管银行如何通过存款融资作为承诺工具，提高债务容量和可抵押资产，并优化债券与存款的混合比例，以协调内部激励与外部约束。
Abstract We consider a regulated bank with access to bond and insured deposit financing. Bank manager‐owners have specific abilities, which allows them to extract rents. We show that deposit finance acts as a commitment device that has the potential to raise the overall debt capacity of the bank and increases pledgeable assets. Our focus is on the optimal mix of bond and deposit financing. We find that in the optimum, the bank chooses a debt structure so as to align internal incentives with external constraints. The model predicts that banks with more risky assets or with more specialised human capital use deposit financing to a lesser extent.