Impoundment at the State Level
研究了美国州长扣押预算资金的权力，通过调查行政预算官员，发现该权力主要用于应对收入短缺时维持预算平衡，但对大多数州长而言并非特别有效的政策工具。
Presidential impoundment authority has been given extensive attention in the budgeting literature. Little research, however, has examined impoundment powers at the state level. This research note is an exploratory study of impoundment powers at the state level, focusing primarily on gubernatorial rescission authority. We use a survey of executive budgeting officers to examine the structure, use, and effectiveness of impoundment powers in the states. We find that gubernatorial impoundment authority is generally used to maintain balanced budgets during times of revenue shortfall. We also find that impoundments do not serve as a particularly effective policy mechanism for most governors.