Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence From Teacher Absences
研究美国《不让一个孩子掉队法案》对教师缺勤的影响，发现未达标学校的教师缺勤率下降约10%，且主要由低效教师驱动，但缺勤减少仅能解释学业成绩提升的一小部分。
Abstract The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) increased accountability pressure in U.S. public schools by threatening to impose sanctions on Title‐1 schools that failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in consecutive years. Difference‐in‐difference estimates of the effect of failing AYP in the first year of NCLB on teacher effort in the subsequent year suggest that on average, teacher absences in North Carolina fell by about 10 percent. The probability of being frequently absent similarly decreased. These reductions in teacher absences were driven by within‐teacher increases in effort and by teachers in the bottom half of the effectiveness distribution. On average, only a modest amount of the achievement gains attributable to the increased accountability pressure are explained by the corresponding decline in teacher absences.