The Role of Bank Reputation in “Certifying” Future Performance Implications of Borrowers’ Accounting Numbers
研究银团贷款中主牵头行声誉如何缓解借贷双方信息不对称，发现高声誉银行关联的借款人在贷款后三年内盈利能力和信用质量更高，且会计盈余更可持续、债务契约价值更强。
ABSTRACT We investigate the role played by the reputation of lead arrangers of syndicated loans in mitigating information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. We hypothesize that syndications by more reputable arrangers are indicative of higher borrower quality at loan inception and more rigorous monitoring during the term of the loan. We investigate whether borrowers with more reputable lead arrangers realize superior performance subsequent to loan origination relative to borrowers with less reputable arrangers. We further examine whether certification by high‐reputation lead banks extends to the quality of borrowers’ reported accounting numbers. Controlling for endogenous matching of borrowers and lead banks, we find that higher bank reputation is associated with higher profitability and credit quality in the three years subsequent to loan initiation. We also show that bank reputation is associated with long‐run sustainability of earnings via higher earnings persistence, and debt contracting value of accounting via a stronger connection between pre‐loan profitability and future credit quality. We further document that the enhanced earnings sustainability associated with higher reputation lead banks reflects both superior fundamentals and accruals more closely linked with future cash flows.