An Experimental Investigation of Alternative Damage-Sharing Liability Regimes with an Auditing Perspective
通过实验市场研究三种损害分担责任制度（审计人过失责任、比例责任、仅审计人支付的比例责任）对策略选择和财富分配的影响，为审计法律责任改革提供参考。
In this study we use experimental markets to investigate some potential effects of three liability regimes that differ on the issue of damage sharing. In the first, termed an auditor (verifier) negligence regime, the verifier is liable if negligent and only he pays damages. In the second, called the proportionate liability regime, a manager (seller) and a verifier are proportionately liable, given certain actions, and both have sufficient wealth to pay damages. The third regime is also a proportionate liability regime, but only verifiers pay damages because sellers lack the wealth to pay their share. The basic design modifies that used in Dopuch and King [1992] to investigate the effects of negligence and strict liability regimes. Our results complement theirs by providing insights into the effects of various damage-sharing regimes on strategy choices and wealth distribution. One of the ongoing debates of auditors' legal liability is the extent to which auditing firms and their partners should be held jointly and